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The year 1989 marked a new beginning. The Berlin Wall fell, and with
it, the Soviet empire. East Germany was soon absorbed by the Federal
Republic of Germany, but other nations in Central and Eastern Europe long
held in captivity by the Soviet Union proclaimed their independence. History
took still another turn in 1991. The Soviet Union itself disintegrated, and from
its ruins a great many new nations emerged in Central Asia and Eastern
Europe.
All the nations that once constituted the Soviet Union and its empire are
now engaged in a reconstructive process of considerable scope and intensity.
One dimension of this reconstructive process is economic: the great socialist
experiment, in which all the means of production were owned by the state,
has been declared a failure. The production of goods and services under
socialism lagged behind that of capitalist societies, and in the name of
economic efficiency reformers are now transferring the ownership of state
enterprises to private hands.
Another facet of the reconstructive process is political. Many former
Soviet-bloc countries have denounced their totalitarian past and have, often
through the adoption of a constitution, committed themselves to democratic
principles - to making government responsive to the desires and wishes of
the citizens instead of the other way around.
In many respects, the economic and political facets of the reconstructive
process are consistent with one another. Indeed, economic reforms may
facilitate the establishment of democracy and are often justified in those terms.
Removing the power over economic decisions such as jobs and income from
the hands of government officials not only improves efficiency, but also
deprives these officials of a powerful instrument of control over the public.
Citizens will feel freer to criticize and disagree. Of course, state officials can
still retaliate against citizen-critics by launching criminal prosecutions.
Criminal sanctions are more visible, however, and thus perhaps harder to
deploy than economic decisions like deciding not to hire or promote someone.
In any event, criminal sanctions were available even under a socialist
economy.
From this perspectiye, the task of building a free press in the new
democracies is rather straightforward. Transfer ownership of all the state-
owned media - both the newspapers and the electronic media - to private
interests. Sell, or simply give away, assets like printing presses and broadcast
facilities. Allow free entry of new media enterprises. In some domains,
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licenses may be necessary to avoid interferences on broadcasting frequencies
due to spectrum scarcity, but such licenses can be awarded to the highest
bidders or through a lottery. Aside from the economic gains, this program of
rapid privatization would enhance the independence of the print and electronic
media from government officials; the media would then be able to provide
citizens with information and opinions that are fiercely critical of state
officials. For the first time, citizens would be in a position to choose their
representatives in an informed manner and to force state officials to respond
to the desires of the public.
One hitch may arise from the fact that the reporters and journalists
working for the newly privatized media are likely to be the same ones who
worked for the state-owned media in the past. Changes in ownership do not
immediately produce a change of staff. Additional efforts may therefore be
necessary to overcome the effects of life in a totalitarian society, which is
likely to have dulled or destroyed the critical faculties of journalists who
served the dictatorship.' Reporters and other journalists must therefore be
encouraged to use the privileges of freedom purchased for them by private
capital. Journalists may also need to organize themselves and elevate
journalism into an honorable profession, independent of the state and devoted
to making government policies responsive to citizens' desires.
In time, state officials might retaliate or sanction outspoken critics in the
newly privatized press. Such actions might take criminal or civil forms. State
officials might charge particular journalists or broadcasters with lessening the
esteem of the state (seditious libel), destroying the reputations of individual
public officials (defamation), disclosing state secrets (subversion), or even
fomenting unrest (inciting a breach of the peace).2 Such state actions are not
necessarily mean-spirited or vindictive. They often are intended to protect
legitimate state interests - for example, maintaining public order or insuring
the smooth functioning of government. Nevertheless, in order to permit the
press freely to criticize government - to provide what has been called
"breathing space"3 - these retaliatory actions by the state against the newly
privatized media should be strictly restrained.
How might this be done? We in the United States have struggled with this
question for some time now in a setting where the press is almost entirely
privately owned, and we have hit on a solution that may be instructive. We
have adopted a written constitution that guarantees freedom of the press and
turned to the courts - an institution that stands above the fray of partisan
politics and insulated from sanctions by the political branches - to enforce
that law. As a result, legal doctrine has emerged that confers a certain
measure of autonomy on the press. This autonomy varies from context to
context, depending on the political value of the speech and the strength of the
countervailing state interest. Small, tentative gestures in the same direction
1. See RFE/RL Research Institute Staff, Regional Survey: The Media in Eastern Europe, RADIO
FREE EUiROPE/RADIO LIBERTY RES. REP. 22, 22-23, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32 (May 7, 1993).
2. For a discussion of the various ways in which the state may interfere with the free functioning
of the press, see HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION 3-73 (1988).
3. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964).
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have appeared in the new democracies of the East, most notably Hungary.4
They should be encouraged, though they will not be enough.
Underlying the general strategy I have been outlining for building a free
press - privatizing the press, encouraging journalists to see themselves as
members of a profession, and creating for the press a constitutionally
protected zone of autonomy from state regulation - is an assumption that the
state is the natural enemy of democracy. Indeed, aside from the purely
economic considerations, privatization recommends itself so strongly as a
democratic strategy because it takes control of the press away from the state.
Such an assumption about the unfriendly posture of the state is most
understandable in a transitional democracy, where people have lived under a
state dictatorship for many years and are now trying to escape from that
horror. The transition occurring in the former Soviet empire, however, will
not last forever. In any event, memories of the immediate past should not
obscure the full dimensions of the reconstructive process. For more than two
hundred years the United States has had a continuous democracy, and in this
setting we have learned that the state can have two faces - sometimes it acts
as an enemy of democracy, sometimes as its friend.
This view of the state may initially seem paradoxical, a replay of the
double-talk that characterized the socialist dictatorships of the not-too-distant
past. The role of the state in protecting democracy becomes clear, however,
once it is understood that the market is itself a structure of constraint.
Although the newly privatized press might be called "free" because the state
does not own or control the papers or radio and television stations, the media
do not operate in a social vacuum. The owners will seek to maximize their
profit by maximizing revenue and minimizing costs, and competitive pressure
will curb their capacity to maximize revenue. These are the iron laws of
capitalist economics; they will hold true for the newly privatized press as
much as they do for any other business. The state might therefore be needed
to counteract those constraints placed on the press by the market.
No social actor is completely autonomous. Everyone is embedded in a
social structure and is constrained by it. A question must thus be asked
whether, from a purely political perspective, the constraints imposed by the
market on the media are of any special concern. Those most devoted to
privatization argue that these constraints are not inconsistent with democratic
goals and indeed might actually further such goals. The desire to maximize
revenue will drive publishers and broadcasters to increase the attractiveness
of their product to the public and thus make the coverage and method of
presentation responsive to consumer desires. The public gets what it wants.
Economic theory and the American experience demonstrate the force behind
4. Although the democracies emerging in the former Soviet empire continue to struggle in carving
out an independent role for their judiciaries, on specific occasions the Russian and Hungarian
Constitutional Courts have lent a measure of protection to the press and have kept hostile government
officials at bay. See Frances H. Foster, Izvestiia as a Mirror of Russian Legal Reform: Press, Law, and
Crisis in the Post-Soviet Era, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 675, 694-702 (1993); Andrew Arato, The
Hungarian Constitutional Court in the Media War: Interpretations of Division of Power and Model of
Democracy 4-5 (June 21, 1993) (paper presented at Central European University conference "The
Development of Rights of Access to the Media").
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this view, but I do not believe it conveys the whole story.
First, costs will limit the capacity of the newly privatized media to
respond to consumer desires. Businessmen seek to maximize profits, which
requires minimizing costs as well as maximizing revenues. Therefore, the
media may well offer the public considerably less than it wants. Overwhelmed
by the costs of gathering the news or producing high quality documentaries,
leaders in the television industry will be tempted, for example, to rely on
reruns of "sit-coms" or "soap operas."
Second, reliance on advertising as the method of generating revenue -
typical wherever the press is privatized - will introduce a number of
distortions. Such distortions have occurred in the United States and
undoubtedly will occur in the East. One stems from the obvious fact that
regardless of how much the public desires a program or series of articles,
advertisers will not underwrite these programs or articles unless they are
likely to enhance the sales of the would-be advertisers' products. Some
reporters claimed, for example, that the commercial television networks
slighted coverage of the Gulf War in the United States because advertisers did
not want their products associated with scenes of death and destruction. 5
The power of advertisers over the content of the press is not confined to
such deliberate or discrete interventions. As a general matter, advertisers will
use a particular newspaper or television show only if it is likely to be viewed
or read by people who have the money, taste, and inclination to buy their
products, and publishers and broadcasters will shape their product to appeal
to those persons. As a result, particular "target audiences," not the public in
general, are the special concerns of the privately owned press, and privately
owned newspapers or broadcast facilties may neglect the informational and
cultural needs of groups whose purchasing power is weak or for whom
advertising will have less of a payoff.
Third, while a certain segment of the public may govern the content of
broadcasts and newspapers through ordinary market processes, these
individuals do not make that choice through a process of collective
deliberation. Rather, they act atomistically, and this mode of interaction may
have profound consequences for the statement and definition of their
preferences. The radio or television programs that individuals choose in the
privacy of their homes, after dinner and a day's work, might well be different
than the programs they would choose after fully discussing and debating all
the options. The same is true regarding the daily purchase of a newspaper. In
repudiating the dictatorships of the past and turning to democracy, 89ers have
not committed themselves to deliberating collectively about each and every
social decision, nor does democratic theory require such a commitment.
However, the normative force of any claim made in the name of "the public"
- in this case concerning the coverage of the press - often presupposes such
5. See Bill Carter, Few Sponsors for TV War News, N.Y. TIMES, February 7, 1991, at DI; Rick
Dubrow, TV and the Gulf Wars: TV Networks Shying From Vivid Violence, L.A. TIMES, February 7,
1991, at A10. In response to the withdrawal of advertiser support, CBS executives assured advertisers that
.war specials could be tailored to provide better lead-ins to commercials. One way would be to insert the
commercials after segments that were specially produced with upbeat images or messages about the war,
like patriotic views from the home front." Carter, supra.
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deliberation.
Thus, there is good reason to doubt that the newly privatized media will
give the public all that it wishes. Coverage or broadcasts determined by the
market - what I will call "market-determined speech" - will only be a
rough approximation of "democratically determined speech," the broadcasts
and coverage that a people would choose after full deliberation, unconstrained
by costs, and governed by the principle of one person, one vote.6 There may,
however, be a deeper source of concern: Should the ideal or standard by
which one judges the output of the market be what I have called
democratically determined speech? Democracy involves a choice by a people,
but perhaps that choice does not extend to the views that they should hear or
the positions that they must confront. Perhaps the aspirations should be even
higher.
Democracy is a system of government that ultimately allows the public
to decide how it wishes to live; but democracy presupposes that the public is
fully informed when it makes the judgment. Democracy requires that the
public has all the relevant information and is aware of the contending or
conflicting points of view on any issue. A free press is meant to make this
supposition a reality. One way of expressing this concept is to say that the
mission of the press in a democratic system, whether in one of the new
democracies of the East or in an established democracy such as the United
States, is to produce on matters of public importance a debate that is
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'
Suppose the people decide, however, that they are sick and tired of
"robust public debate," exhausted by discussions over economic policy or the
treatment of ethnic minorities, and are only interested in mind-dulling
entertainment, tabloid newspapers, or television programs that give expression
to their sexual fantasies. Would a democracy require us to respect that choice?
I think not, no more than a commitment to contractual freedom would require
us to respect a contract in which someone sells himself or herself into slavery.
A distinction should thus be drawn between "democratically determined
speech" and what I have called "robust public debate," and the latter should
be the standard against which we must measure the output of the market. Such
a view may seem alien to the system of liberties we have traditionally
associated with democratic governments, but it is not. The American Bill of
Rights, including the protection afforded to the press in the First Amendment,
is often spoken of as a protection of "minority rights" or "individual rights,"
or as a bulwark against the "tyranny of the majority."8 In protecting the press
against state interferences, the Supreme Court never assumed that, by trying
6. Writing on the Polish experience, Karel Jakubowicz makes a similar distinction between what he
terms "free communication" and "democratic communication." He argues that the emerging democracies
of Central and Eastern Europe have placed greater emphasis on the libertarian, market-oriented concept
of "free communication" than on communication that is representative of the community at large. See
Karel Jakubowicz, Freedom vs. Equality, 1993 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 42, 43.
7. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
8. Cf. Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1147-52 (1991)
(challenging conventional wisdom that First Amendment freedoms of speech and press are essentially
aimed at protecting minorities and arguing that "structural core" of First Amendment seeks to protect
popular majorities from hostile congressional action).
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to muzzle the press, the state was acting autonomously, in contravention or
disregard of popular desire or majority will. On the contrary, the Court knew
all too well that state officials, whether legislative or executive, usually act as
instruments of popular will. The Court has therefore imposed upon itself a
responsibility to preserve the robustness of public debate - in other words,
to protect democracy from itself.
In a similar vein, then, the nation builders of the East should be
concerned with constraints imposed by the market, not simply because market-
determined speech will be a poor approximation of democratically determined
speech, but rather because it may well depart significantly from the more
abstract, largely idealized standard of robust public debate. Once the media
are privatized, programming and coverage will be largely determined by the
confluence of a number of factors - marginal cost and marginal revenue, for
example - that have no discernible relationship to needs of a democratic
polity. As businessmen, the owners of the media will have their minds on
profits, not on the task of supplying the public with the information and
opinions it needs in order to exercise its sovereign prerogative.
Even accepting this view, some may treat state constraints on public
debate as being on a wholly different plane than constraints emanating from
the market. This position is commonplace in the United States. To some
extent its currency derives from the precise wording of our guarantee of
freedom of the press, which reads "Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." 9 Conceived in these terms, the
distinction often drawn by American lawyers between the constraints of the
state and those of the market may not be relevant to those now actively
engaged in the process of building new democratic societies, because they
may be drafting new constitutions or interpreting constitutional provisions
worded in more affirmative terms. For example, the new Hungarian
constitution, following the European tradition, states that "[tihe Republic of
Hungary shall recognize and protect freedom of the press.""0 My own
impression, however, is that the American distinction between market
constraints and state constraints actually rests on grounds that are more
philosophic than textual and thus is likely to have a broader appeal.
One justification for drawing a distinction between market and state
constraints construes the domain of public debate and narrowly confines it to
speech that pertains to elections for public office or the work of
government." The democratic mission of the press, so the argument runs,
is to assist the public in choosing government officials and evaluating their
work; the principal danger is that government officials will use their power
to retaliate against those who dare to criticize them.
In my view, however, there is no reason to construe the democratic
mission of the press so narrowly. Certainly, the press should "check"
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
10. A MAGYAR K6ZTARSASAG ALKETMANYA [Constitution] ch. Xll, § 61, cl. 2 (Hungary).
11. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971).
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government officials, to borrow Professor Blasi's term, 2 but it also has a
responsibility to address large questions of economic and social structure such
as the distribution of wealth and the role of workers in the management of
their firms. All such subjects are within the jurisdiction of the electorate in a
democratic society.
Moreover, even if the domain of public debate is conceived narrowly,
thereby limiting it to criticism of government officials and their policies, there
still may be reason to fear market constraints because they have the effect of
favoring certain government policies and the officials who implement them.
Imagine the position a newly privatized press, necessarily relying on huge
infusions of private capital, would take on a political candidate urging a
radical redistribution of wealth or the institution of worker control.
13
Although not every government policy is market-sensitive in this way, many
are; there is thus reason for concern about the impact of market constraints
on public debate even if the concern is confined only to speech that considers
government affairs.
State constraints and market constraints have also been sharply
differentiated because they are enforced by different methods.' 4 The state has
a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and can throw those who violate
its edicts in jail. A media mogul enforces his demands by excluding an article,
shaping a show in a certain way, or firing a reporter who turns in copy that
does not sell papers. In actual practice, however, this distinction between
enforcement methods may be less clear-cut. The state can enforce its
constraints through civil remedies (e.g., damage awards or denial of licenses);
if the United States is any guide, such remedies may well become
commonplace. The presumed difference in the harshness of the sanctions is
also questionable. How much worse is it to throw someone in jail than for a
person to be fired or have his business fail? Yet even if we allow for these
distinctions, the different methods by which the state and market enforce their
edicts is not significant from democracy's perspective. What matters is not the
moral quality of the means used to enforce a constraint nor the hardship
suffered by the individual who bears the brunt of the sanction, but rather the
effect of the constraint upon public discourse.
For these reasons, I believe that reformers of the East must be as aware
of the market constraints on the press as they are of state constraints. Rapid
privatization, buttressed by judicial doctrine declaring the autonomy of the
press and a professional ethos promoting independence from the state, should
remain the overall strategy. Privatization is necessary to eradicate the
traditions of suppression that the dictatorial practices of the past may have
created. However, the reformers must not stop at that point. They must also
contemplate a wide number of interstitial strategies to counteract the
12. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. REs.
J. 523.
13. For a discussion of the ways in which the Western press has failed to cover the "grand issues,"
including social structure and distribution of wealth, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS
204-07 (1977).
14. See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 225, 235-37 (1992).
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constraining effect of the market.
Although crafting these interstitial strategies will be a daunting
responsibility for the 89ers, they may find some guidance in the experience
of America, which for many years has accepted private ownership for the
basic economic structure of the media but supplemented that structure in a
number of ways. We have experimented with two types of supplemental
regulations; one might be called "program regulation," the other "structural
regulation." Within the category of program regulation, I would include the
Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") "fairness doctrine," which
requires broadcasters to cover issues of public importance and to do so
fairly. 5 Program regulations might also include laws allowing persons
subject to personal or political attack to respond,16 and requirements that the
networks give adequate coverage to presidential elections. 17 At one time
public interest groups attempted to have the FCC require networks to air
"editorial advertisements."18 This too might be considered a program
regulation.
Antitrust laws are an example of structural regulation, though they are
limited in that they seek to perfect the market rather than to counteract it. 9
A more robust variant appears in the "cross ownership" rules of the FCC,
which prohibit the owner of a newspaper from acquiring a television or radio
station in the same market." The assumption is that such acquisitions could
not be barred on purely economic grounds. An even more significant form of
structural regulation is Congress's decision in the 1960s to establish and fund
a public broadcasting network that was to supplement rather than supplant the
commercial networks.2" Such a public broadcasting system could cover issues
likely to be slighted by the commercial networks but that are nevertheless vital
to democratic self-government.22 Finally, mention should be made of the
FCC's policy to give preference to racial minorities in awarding licenses.'
15. For a discussion of the background and content of the fairness doctrine, see Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-71 (1969). See also Randall Rainey, The Public's Interest in
Public Affairs Discourse, Democratic Governance, and Fairness in Broadcasting: A Critical Review of the
Public Interest Duties of the Electronic Media, 82 GE. L.J. 269 (1993).
16. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
17. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
18. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
19. Despite antitrust laws and enforcement in the United States, 98% of all American cities with a
daily newspaper had only one such publication as of 1986. See Robbie Steel, Joint Operating Agreements
in the Newspaper Industry: A Threat to First Amendment Freedoms, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 275, 277 (1989).
See generally William E. Lee, Antitrust Enforcement, Freedom of the Press, and the "Open Market ': The
Supreme Court on the Structure and Content of Mass Media, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1249 (1979).
20. See Second Report and Order, Amendment to Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard,
FM, and Television Stations, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046 (1975). The FCC's 'cross ownership" rules were at issue
in a recent case in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See News America Publishing v.
FCC, 844 F.2d 300 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
21. See Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-99 (1967).
22. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A PROGRAM FOR
ACTION (1967).
23. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this policy in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). Two years later, however, the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit invalidated a similar FCC policy giving preference
to women in the licensing process. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir 1992). The author
of Lamprecht, Clarence Thomas, is now a justice of the Supreme Court. Four of the five justices in the
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To some extent, the policy can be understood as a way of improving the
social status of minorities; yet it also has a speech dimension and can
therefore be considered a form of structural regulation. This view assumes
that race is a proxy for viewpoint, and that the new owners will exercise
discretion allowed to them by the market in favor of diversifying
programming and thus enriching public debate.
Although the regulatory measures I have just described are aimed mainly
at television and radio, as opposed to newspapers, they can be adapted to the
newspaper industry. The Supreme Court has accepted some legal constraints
on newspapers (for example, in the antitrust context), but it has generally been
hostile to any regulation of newspapers and has built into the law a distinction
between electronic and print media. Most notably, the Court invalidated a
Florida right-to-reply statue that presumably would have been constitutional
if applied to broadcasters.24 This distinction is difficult to justify, however,
and those trying to create a new constitutional framework for their countries
might safely ignore this odd feature of our law.
Newspapers are part of the working press, as are television and radio
stations. All shape public discourse and inform people of the world that lies
beyond their immediate experience. Broadcast television and radio stations
must receive licenses from the state in order to avoid interferences on the
electromagnetic spectrum. Cable television and radio stations transmit their
signals over wires, but they might also need a system of licensing to preserve
the integrity of public streets or spaces, in much the same manner as does a
telephone system.' There is, however, no physical imperative for the
licensing of newspapers. Consequently, a distinction between the electronic
and print media may be thought to arise from the way property rights are
created. The property rights of a television or radio station have their origins
in a deliberate, allocative decision of government, specifically the award of
a license. The property rights of newspapers have a more diffuse origin; they
come from laws that apply to all businesses. However, the special status of
the press and its claim for freedom derive from the function of that institution
in society - to inform the public - and should not turn on the source of its
property rights or the particular dynamics that gave rise to them. 6
The supplemental state interventions I have described seek to enrich
rather than impoverish public debate and are generally referred to under the
category of the "right to access." This term, introduced into American
constitutional discourse by an influential article in the late 1960s by Professor
majority in Metro Broadcasting, Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, have since retired.
24. See Miami Herald Publishing Co., 418 U.S. at 241.
25. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994) (holding that must-carry
provisions, because of special burdens and obligations they impose upon cable operators and programmers,
demand heightened First Amendment scrutiny).
26. The Supreme Court has recognized the place of television and radio as part of the working press
in other areas of the law, such as libel, where broadcasters are endowed with the very same privileges and
responsibilities that belong to newspapers. Admittedly, the obscenity standard has been adjusted to permit
greater state control of the electronic media. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Nevertheless, this greater state control is premised on the difficulty of shielding unwitting or especially
vulnerable audiences (e.g., children) from radio or television broadcasts, rather than on the idea that
television or radio are not part of the press.
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Jerome Barron,27 seeks to capitalize on the mystique that surrounds "rights-
talk" in the United States. The term is misleading for that very reason,
however. While most of the rights that figure in contemporary constitutional
debates, for instance the right to procreative freedom, further some
individualistic value, properly understood Barron's "right to access" does not
attempt to protect the self-expressive interests of an individual citizen seeking
access. Rather, it is intended to further a social goal: the production of robust
public debate. A more apt expression - and the one I will use to refer to the
entire panoply of program and structural regulations that seek to enrich public
debate - is "access regulations."
Even with this emendation, an ambiguity persists. People speak of access,
but they do not specify access to what. Because the purpose of access
regulations is to enrich public discourse, rather than to give vent to some self-
expressive interest of an individual, what must be guaranteed is access to the
public, not access to a medium. Access to a radio or television station or
newspaper is only a means of affording access to the public, and any access
regulation should be judged accordingly. For this reason, the so-called public
access channels commonly found on American cable television are inadequate.
The person appearing on the television at 3:00 A.M. may feel some measure
of personal satisfaction, but what he or she says plays no more role in public
deliberations than the insights of a book buried deep in the stacks of a
university library. Of course, a would-be listener can seek out the viewpoint,
but one must be realistic about the public's inquisitiveness. On the other hand,
aslong as the viewpoint or information is in general circulation and thus fully
available to the public, no further demand for access remains. The predicate
for regulation dissolves, and to insist upon access in these circumstances
would be unnecessary, perhaps even vindictive. To use a metaphor of Charles
Fried, it would be "a way of showing off power by hoisting flags on other
people's flagpoles."28
Viewed broadly, then, the American constitutional experience has two
sides. To fulfill its democratic mission, the press must have a measure of
autonomy from the state, but that autonomy must never preclude access
regulations. The basic structure should be privately owned, but some state
subsidies are appropriate to create television or radio stations and even
opinion journals that are not totally controlled by the market. Legal doctrine
must protect the press from state regulations that stifle public debate (e.g.,
prosecutions for seditious libel), but not those that have the opposite effect
(e.g., the fairness doctrine). As a matter of professional ethics, journalists
must maintain their independence from the state without identifying too
closely with the economic goals of the enterprises for which they work. At
every turn, the press must inform the public of the issues before them and
present the conflicting and diverse views on those issues. Only then will
citizens be in a position to exercise the prerogative that democracy promises.
27. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1641 (1967). Professor Barron has further developed his ideas in JEROME A. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS FOR WHOM? THE RIGHT OF AccEss TO MASS MEDIA (1973).
28. Fried, supra note 14, at 253. Fried applied this metaphor to all program regulation, which he
refers to as "forced programming," on the questionable hypothesis that the public will always tune out.
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The risk is great, however, that 89ers will ignore the multifaceted quality
of the American constitutional experience. The reformers may come to believe
that freedom of the press requires no more than autonomy from the state,
ignoring the need for access regulations. This misreading of the American
experience may have many sources, including the activism of international
monetary organizations. More likely, this belief will derive from an odd
fortuity of timing: the reconstruction is being undertaken at a time when the
validity of access regulations are most suspect. During the 1960s and early
1970s, America understood the importance of access regulations. Over the
next two decades, however, the activist state fell into disfavor and we became
more and more obsessed with the wonders of the market. As a result, the
"right of access" and the entire idea of regulating the press in the name of
democracy came under increasing attack. I fear that 89ers, like all politicians,
may have limited time horizons and confuse the Reagan years with the whole
of the American experience.
Looking to America to guide them in the reconstructive endeavor, the
89ers will therefore need a broad historical perspective. They will also require
a measure of critical discernment to assess the many objections that were
raised to access regulations during the 1970s and 1980s. One such objection
arose from a doubt about whether such regulations actually enriched public
debate. Some argued that the fairness doctrine made the networks more
careful about what they broadcasted, for fear that if they carried a
controversial show, they would need to allow time for a response. The effect
of regulation was, so some claimed, a form of self-censorship - grey speech.
On the other side, proponents of state intervention argued that certain
features of the regulatory program - for example, the affirmative requirement
to cover issues of public importance - might guard against grey speech.
These proponents also insisted upon the need to judge the efficacy of the
fairness doctrine or other access regulations on a comparative basis. Even
assuming some self-censorship due to regulation, broadcasting might be more
varied and more keyed to public issues than if the regulation did not exist at
all. To assess fully the impact of access regulations, one must not look simply
to the incidents of self-censorship, but should also consider the whole program
of access regulations and imagine how varied broadcasting or coverage would
be if these regulations did not exist. Only then would we know whether they
enriched or impoverished public debate.
This objection to access regulations turned on empirical judgments about
their likely consequences, but others were more principled. Specifically, some
critics argued that access regulations, by their very nature, are not content-
neutral and thus violate the principle prohibiting content regulation. This
principle is founded on the idea that the choice over public issues belongs to
the public, and that state officials should not determine the merit of ideas or
even favor one side over another in a public debate. State officials must be
neutral on public issues and let the people decide what is best for themselves.
Such a requirement of state neutrality seems attractive, firmly rooted in
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democratic theory,29 but I do not see it as barring access regulations either
in the United States or in the new democracies of the East.
Admittedly, content judgments are implicit in access regulations. With
program regulation, content judgments are made directly; with structural
regulation, indirectly. Given the scarcity of resources and the multiplicity of
viewpoints, state officials must judge what views or positions to favor,
whether they are awarding subsidies, granting preferences to groups in the
licensing process, or determining whether an issue is one of public
importance. However, such content judgments made in fashioning or
enforcing access regulation do not determine outcome, but only protect the
integrity of the deliberative process. The state is functioning like a
parliamentarian, trying to make certain that the public is fully informed,
almost as if it were saying, "Let's hear from the other side," or "We have
heard that point several times now."
In making these calls the state qua parliamentarian is obviously looking
to the content of what is said. However, the rule requiring content neutrality
should not bar the state from doing so, for properly understood, that rule bars
only those content judgments that have no purpose or justification other than
to shape outcome. Of course, any regulation of process will necessarily affect
outcome. Yet the choice that democratic theory seeks to insulate from state
influence or control is one preceded by full debate, not one that is uninformed
or ill-considered. Although a fully informed citizen is likely to make a
different decision than an uninformed one, the state's role in educating the
citizen and thus producing a different outcome is not at all inconsistent with
democratic principles.
Sly politicians can always say they are interested in regulating only
process when in fact they have no purpose other than to manipulate outcome.
The danger of such manipulation calls for institutional arrangements that take
program or structural regulation out of the hands of those most intensely
interested in political outcomes and place it in the hands of agencies that are
relatively removed from politics. In the United States, for example, we placed
the administration of the fairness doctrine and control over the licensing
process in the hands of the FCC rather than the President or Congress.
Similarly, we established an independent public corporation, the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting, to administer the congressionally funded radio and
television networks. This corporation is still dependent on annual
appropriations but otherwise is insulated from direct control by Congress or
the President."
29. See T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Content Regulation Reconsidered, in DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA
331, 331 (Judith Lichtenberg ed., 1990); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 46 (1987). See generally KALVEN, supra note 2.
30. By statute, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting is largely independent of control by Congress
or the Executive; 47 U.S.C. § 398(a) prohibits "any department, agency, officer, or employee of the
United States [from exercising] any direction, supervision, or control over public telecommunications, or
over the Corporation or any of its contractors, or over the charter or bylaws of the Corporation ... "
Measures have also been taken to lessen the influence of partisan politics on the Corporation. The
members of the Corporation's board are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, but 47
U.S.C. § 396(c)(1) provides-that no more than six of the ten members may be from the same political
party. See generally Steven D. Zansberg, Note, "Objectivity and Balance" in Public Broadcasting:
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These measures built on a long American tradition, dating from the turn
of the century, of independent regulatory agencies. Obviously, the emerging
democracies of the East have no such tradition on which to rely, and must
therefore be especially inventive. They must create new institutions that are
part of the state, yet far from direct political control. The difficulties inherent
in such a task, especially where the totalitarian regime of the recent past
politicized all institutions, are indeed formidable. Still, this challenge is no
less daunting than creating the institutions of advanced capitalism - a banking
system or a securities market - out of the shambles of state socialism.
Even with such independent agencies or institutions, the risk still persists
that the power to make content judgments will be used, not to preserve the
integrity of public debate, but to skew the debate in favor of one outcome.
Although the regulators say they want the public to hear both sides of debate
on the proposed tax law, they give access only to the proponents of the tax
law or curb the speech of business interests because they want the measure
enacted. The risk of a skewed outcome can be minimized but can never be
eliminated altogether. On the other hand, by adopting a strong prophylactic
rule - one denying state officials any power whatsoever to make judgments
based on content - a government would simply allow the debate to be wholly
shaped by the market, which, of course, is not neutral as to content. The
biases of the market are not produced by government officials acting
deliberately, but rather derive from businessmen competing with one another.
Nevertheless, from democracy's perspective, the concern is just as great.
Democracy requires full and open debate on all issues of public importance.
Any constraint on that debate threatens democracy, regardless of the identity
of the interfering agency or the precise nature of the dynamic that brings it
into being.
Access regulations not only require the government to make content
judgments, but also sometimes - especially in the case of program regulation
- require a newspaper or television or radio station to carry a message or
article that the owners of the enterprise find odious. The purpose of such a
requirement is not to punish or humble the newspaper or station for having
engaged in scandalous reporting, but rather to increase the amount of
information and number of viewpoints available to the public. Still, some
critics question whether such compulsion is consistent with the guarantee that
individuals remain free not to support or affirm an idea that they find
offensive. In the United States that principle found expression in a famous
Supreme Court decision of 1943, West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette;31 elsewhere, it may be seen as a necessary corollary of democracy.
In its original context, the Barnette decision was a powerful affirmation
of freedom of conscience and religious liberty. Handing down the decision
during wartime, the Supreme Court refused to capitulate to the patriotic fervor
then sweeping the country and protected young school children from being
Unwise, Unworkable, and Unconstitutional, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 184 (1994) (arguing that 1992
"objectivity and balance" amendment to legislation reauthorizing funding for Corporation for Public
Broadcasting is unconstitutional and inconsistent with purpose of government-funded public broadcasting).
31. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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compelled to salute the American flag. These children, who were Jehovah's
Witnesses, found the pledge of allegiance inconsistent with their faith.32 The
Court's decision did not seem to apply to the various regulations of the type
I am recommending. In fact, access regulations were never challenged on
Barnette-type grounds during the period in which they were first developed.
However, in the late 1980s the Supreme Court, in Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. Public Utilities Conmmission,33 ripped the right not to speak from its
original context and used it to invalidate an access regulation developed by
California for public utilities, thereby casting serious doubts on the validity of
all access regulations.
In the Pacific Gas case, a power company challenged a regulation
requiring it to allow a public interest organization to use the so-called extra
space in its billing envelope in order to reach the public. The extra space
consisted of the space in a billing envelope that could carry an insert without
increasing the minimum postage charge. The power company had previously
used that space for distributing its own newsletter, until the utility commission
allocated it to the public interest group to use four times a year. In response,
the Supreme Court invoked the Barnette principle and concluded that the
utility commission had violated the free speech guarantee of the First
Amendment.
The significance of Pacific Gas for program regulation of the press was
recognized immediately. The author of the plurality opinion, Justice Powell,
made reference to the earlier Court decision invalidating the Florida right-to-
reply statute to support his conclusion, and in 1987 the FCC read Pacific Gas
as requiring it to abandon the fairness doctrine.34 If requiring a utility
company to carry in its billing envelope a message that it finds offensive
violates the First Amendment, the FCC reasoned, requiring a network to
broadcast a show that it finds offensive would also violate the First
Amendment. In my view, both the Supreme Court's decision'in Pacific Gas
and the FCC's extension of it to the press are questionable.
In a society in which the press is privately owned, program regulation or
state-mandated access compromises property rights and diminishes the
economic values associated with those rights. The mandated message or
program will displace an article or program a station or publisher deems more
profitable. The displaced message can only be carried if extra pages are added
or the broadcast day is somehow extended. The economic loss may be small,
but it is still a loss.
Some may see this economic loss as imposing a duty of compensation on
the state, under the theory - commonplace in capitalist societies - that
property cannot be taken for public use without compensation. However, the
Supreme Court rejected a claim of compensation in a case involving still a
another type of access regulation - California required shopping center
owners to allow political activists on their property for purposes of reaching
32. Id. at 629.
33. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
34. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5057, 5070 n.227, 5071 nn.241-46 (1987).
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the public.35 The Supreme Court ruled that the economic loss caused by this
requirement of the state (protest activities may induce shoppers to stay away)
was only a regulation, not a taking of property. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court placed great stress on the general application of the regulation.
Wisely, Pacific Gas did not question this ruling. No member of the Court
thought the utility commission regulation was a taking of the power
company's property. Presumably, the result would be the same in a press case
or a case involving a business without a government-conferred monopoly. If
the economic loss occasioned by granting access to a shopping center or a
billing envelope is not a taking, neither is the economic loss suffered by the
press when access to it is granted. Although there is an economic loss, most
government regulation of business involves such a loss and none of the special
conditions that transform regulations into takings are present.
The free speech claim does not arise from the economic loss alone, but
rather from the compulsion of owners to support financially ideas that they
may actually detest. It is hard, however, to turn this objection into a viable
principle of constitutional law without dismantling the modern democratic
state. The entire taxation system of the modern state is predicated on the idea
that money taken from citizens may support activities they detest, like war,
parades, particular lectures at state universities, or controversial books in
public libraries. Such compelled financial support is an obligation of
citizenship, necessary to serve community purposes, which in the case of
access regulations include the preservation of the democratic process itself.
The use of an individual's property to support activities he or she detests is
a necessary price of democracy.
The Court faintly acknowledged this idea in Pacific Gas. Justice Powell
readily admitted that the power company could be taxed or assessed for
purposes of supporting the public interest group.36 Given that admission, the
objection to directly giving access to the billing envelope to this public interest
group is hard to comprehend. There is no functional difference between, on
the one hand, giving the public interest group the space ordinarily used by the
power company and then requiring the company to pay the extra postage and,
on the other hand, taxing or assessing the power company and then giving the
money to the public interest group in order to disseminate its ideas. No
constitutional difference exists between property and its economic value, or,
to put the point more generally, between program and structural regulation.
Of course, giving access to some specific items of property - a shopping
center, mailing envelope, newspaper, radio station, or television channel -
presents a risk of false attribution not present with taxation. Some readers or
viewers might think the message conveyed is that of the publisher or station
rather than the view of the person or organization given access. For that
reason, the right claimed in Pacific Gas is often described as a right against
forced association instead of a right not to speak (as in the Barnette case).
However, as the shopping center case demonstrates, few people would falsely
35. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
36. Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 19.
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attribute the ideas of those given access to the utility company, the publisher,
or the television station. In any event, the danger of false attribution should
require a disclaimer, not denial of access altogether. Requiring an
organization to issue a disclaimer - for example, "the ideas presented are not
those of the station" - forces that organization to speak, but not in the way
that the child in Barnette was forced to speak. This speech does not perpetuate
an orthodoxy; it makes the opposite possible.
Like the rule against content regulation, the rule protecting the right not
to speak should not be read as a bar to access regulations. Both rules have an
important role to play in democratic societies, but the proper domain of these
rules must be carefully delineated. They should not be read as precluding state
regulation that broadens public debate and thus enables the press to perform
its democratic mission. We in the United States have often overlooked this
point, and over the last twenty years have used these two principles to cast
access regulations, especially program regulations, into doubt. It can only be
hoped that the reconstructive enterprises now afoot in the East will not
replicate this experience.
In building a free press, the reformers should look to the American
experience, but only selectively. They must create for the press a measure of
autonomy from the state without delivering the press totally and completely
to the vicissitudes of the market. Privatization of the most rigid and
unrelenting variety, denying any role whatsoever for access regulations, may
be a step beyond the dictatorships of the past, but it is still a great distance
from the dreams of 1989.
